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The  paper  examines  the  temporal  relationship  between  revenues  and 
expenditures for the four southern states during 1980 to 2005. Using an 
error-correction model and Granger causality test, it finds that the tax-
spend  hypothesis  is  supported  by  the  analsysis.  The  spend-tax 
hypothesis  is  valid  for  Karnataka;  fiscal  synchronization  hypothesis  is 
supported for Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, while the data for Tamil Nadu 
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In this paper, we ask the following set of questions: do the governments 
in Southern states of India (namely, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu 
and Karnataka) incur large fiscal deficits?  If so, then what is the mode of 
incurring such deficits? What would be the appropriate measure to curb 
deficits?    
 
  These questions are important because, Keynesian endorsements 
notwithstanding, persistent budget deficits are always a concern among 
the  economists.  If  governments  earn  less  than  what  it  spends  (and 
finances the gap through borrowing), and if the spending is not adequate 
to  boost  up  the  growth  rate  above  the  interest  rate  a  debt  trap  is 
generated. On the other hand, if, in order to reduce higher volume of 
accumulating deficit, government increases the tax rate and cuts social 
expenditure  heavily,  it  may  face  adverse  consequences  for  economic 
development. A third option is to print more money, which is associated 
with  inflation  tax.  Since  all  remedies  are  associated  with  a  cost, 
institutions  must  be  designed  in  such  a  way  that  the  power  of  the 
government to create fiscal deficits is reduced. As it turns out, the nature 
of such institutions depend on the so called revenue-spending nexus. 
 
  The  causal  relationship  between  revenues  and  government 
expenditure  is  a  classic  problem  of  Public  Economics.  There  are  four 
propositions  that  can  potentially  explain  observed  spending-revenue 
behaviour. The propositions are briefly discussed as follows: the tax-to-
spend  hypothesis  suggests  that  the  government  first  determines  the 
budget  and  then  decides  how  much  to  spend.  Conventional  wisdom 
suggests that such a policy necessarily reduces budget deficit. However, 
this is not strictly correct. As Friedman (1978) suggests, if changes in 
government revenue leads to changes in government expenditure, then 
an existing deficit does not shrink in volume. If revenues have a positive  
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impact  on  expenditure,  then  decreasing  revenues  will  lead  to  lower 
deficit. 
 
  A  slightly  different  proposition  comes  from  Buchanan  and 
Wagner  (1977,  78).  According  to  them,  although  government  revenue 
determines government expenditure, the relationship is opposite to what 
Friedman  predicts.  Government  expenditures  financed  by  means  other 
than  taxation  results  in  the  public‟s  perception  that  the  price  of 
government  expenditure  is  less  than  what  it  would  be  under  taxation 
(and they favour such an outcome). Although the agents are paying less 
in terms of tax, fiscal illusion arises because they do not see the cost in 
terms of higher interest rate and crowding out. So lowering of taxes is 
associated with higher government spending. Formally, this hypothesis 
can be expressed as 
Gt = f(Rt-j) 
Or 
 Gt =f( Rt-j) 
 
   Here, Gt is expenditure in time t, Rt is revenue in time t, j = 0, 1, 
2, 3… and  is the change.  f  is expected to be positive if the Friedman 
version  is  true,  while  it  is  negative  if  the  Buchanan -Wagner  version  is 
true. 
 
  At  the  other  extreme,  we have  the  spend-to-tax  hypothesis: 
(changes in) government expenditure leads to (a change in) government 
revenue. This view has been well summarized by Dalton (1923), "while 
an  individual  adjusts  income  to  expenditure;  a  public  authority  adjusts 
expenditure to income". Notice that such an act always creates or widens 
a pre-existing deficit in the first place. It is argued that government can 
not postpone expenditure on certain sectors, such as health, education or  
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defence, and hence, it can not or does not care about the deficit.1 If 
spend-to-tax hypothesis is true, then, in order to reduce budget deficits, 
the  ability  of  the  government  to  spend  above  its  means  should  be 
minimized. This hypothesis can be expressed as 
Rt = f(Gt-j ) 
Or 
 Rt = f(Gt-j) 
 
  Here  we  expect  0 f   .  One  can  see  that  the  two  competing 
hypotheses  prescribe  opposite  institutional  reforms  in  order  to  contain 
budget deficit. 
  Spend-and-tax  hypothesis  suggests  that  revenue  and  spending 
decisions  are  taken  and  executed  at  the   same  time.  Typically, 
government, as a rational agent, equates the marginal cost of taxation 
with  the  marginal  benefit  of  government  spending.  Revenue  and 
government  expenditure  are  linked  through  balanced  budget,  so  that, 
either 
Rt = f (Gt) 
Or 
 Rt =f (Gt) 
 
  Last,  but  not  the  least,  in  US,  some  spending  decisions  and 
revenue decisions are institutionally uncoupled. If this is the case, then 
expenditure and revenue are causally independent. 
 
  For  the  sake  of  completeness,  let  us  remember  that  there  is 
another angle to the whole issue. From a political economy point of view, 
incumbent  governments  (that  are  unsure  to  win  any  election)  may 
indulge in spending just before the election in order to leave the next 
                                                 
1  Such  reasoning  forms  the  intellectual  backbone  for  the  modern  interpretation  of 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis (Barro, 1974) that current expenditure translates into 
higher future tax revenue and agents are perfectly able to see through it.  
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government (ruled by, presumably, another party)  in trouble.1 On the 
other hand governments are fiscally prudent if firmly ensconced. 
 
  The  importance  of  the  problem  is  can  be  hardly  overstated, 
especially  in  a  federal  country  like  India.  In  a  federal  economy,  sub 
national governments (SNG‟s) must rely on central transfer in presence of 
vertical inequality. If the SNG‟s anticipate that, in moment of fiscal crisis, 
a (weak)central authority will bail them out through lump sum(i.e. non 
formulaic) transfers, then such a belief generates perverse incentive to 
generate a deficit at the sub national level through lower local revenue.2 
This  has  two  (related)  implications.  Either  the  SNG‟s  accumulate  large 
debts  and  (unproductive)  debt  servicing  becomes  responsibility  of  the 
central government3 or they rely increasingly on central grants (vis-à-vis 
local  revenue)  in  order  to  provide  (productive)  local  public  goods.  To 
arrest such trends, the Twelfth Finance Commission has recommended 
that states that ratify Fiscal Responsibility Act (i.e. committed to reduce 
the deficit by a certain limit), will receive substantial debt relief. However, 
there is no indication of how this would be achieved: states are left with 
their own devices in order to reduce the deficit. Yet, as the discussion 
suggests, it is vitally important to establish the link between revenue and 
expenditure. 
 
  The  issue  essentially  becomes  an  empirical  one  involving  the 
standard  time  series  investigations  of  long  run  relationships  among 
variables (cointegration and unit root), short run deviation from long run 
DGP and the associated adjustment process (error correction) as well as 
causality analysis (Granger Causality, VAR). As expected, the literature is 
not unanimous regarding the conclusion. Among recent attempts, Bohn 
(1991), Mounts and Sowell(1997), Koren and Stiassny (1998) as well as 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Alesina and Tabellini (1990).  
2 This fear was implicit in Madison’s famous caveat. See The Federalist, 10. 
3 During the 1990’s, in Brazil and Argentina, bailouts created Macroeconomic problems.  
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Change,  Liu  and  Caudill  (2002)  support  the  tax-to-spend  hypothesis, 
wheareas Jones and Joulfaian (1991) and Ross and Payne(1998) argue in 
favour of spend to tax hypothesis. At a more disaggregated level, Payne 
(1998) finds that, in US, the tax-to-spend hypothesis is supported by the 
budgetary decision of 24 states; the spend-to-tax hypothesis is valid for 8 
states while the fiscal synchronization pattern is observed for 11 states. 
In addition, Miller and Russek (1989), Hasan and Sukar (1995) as well as 
Owoye  (1995)  found  evidence  to  support  the  fiscal  synchronization 
hypothesis.  Finally,  Hoover  and  Sheffrin  (1992)  and  Baghestani  and 
McNown (1994) have provided evidence for the institutional separation 
hypothesis. 
 
  This  ambiguity  is  present  even  in  the  context  of  Indian  data. 
Dhanasekaran  (2001)  found  that  results  do  depend  on  model 
specification. For example, Granger causality test suggests unidirectional 
causality from expenditure to revenue, while Gweke type modeling finds 
partial  (only  when  revenue  is  a  dependent  variable)  evidence  of  bi 
directional  causality.  In  a  more  recent  study,  Raju  (2008)  has 
desegregated the revenue receipts and expenditure patterns. According 
to her, “Support for … spend and tax hypothesis is observed for three of 
the  seven  revenue-expenditure  pairs…  whereas  …  tax-and-spend 
hypothesis is seen for two of the seven revenue-expenditure pairs”.
1 
 
  However, in Indian context, disaggregated state-specific studies 
(in line of Payne, op. cit) are somewhat rare. Bhat et al. (1993) analyzed 
the  states‟  total  expenditure  and  tax  revenue  using  data  from  1969 
to1989,  and  found  evidence  of  bi-directional  causality  using  Granger 
causality test as well as the Sims test. It is not clear from the study if tax 
revenue consists of only own tax revenue or if it includes the share of 
central  tax.
2  Of some interest is the work by Vadlamannati and Veni 
                                                 
1 Emphasis added. 
2 Data description for this work leaves a lot to be desired.  
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(2007)  that  analyzes  the  state  of  Andhra  Pradesh  and  establishes  a 
causal relationship from revenue to expenditure. The political economy 
angle has been analyzed in Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2006). They obtain 
the  result  that,  during  election  years,  state  governments
1  collect less 
commodity tax revenue and spend more on capital accounts (that has 
higher visibility). Thus, in th e vicinity of election years, spending gets 
precedence over taxation. The focus of the paper, however, is not the 
tax-expenditure nexus per se, and hence does not employ the standard 
time series techniques.  
 
  The objective of the present paper is a modest attempt to fill the 
gap. We use data on four southern states (namely Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka,  Kerala  and  Tamil  Nadu),  and  try  to  obtain  temporal 
relationship between the relevant variables. The range of time period is 
from 1980-81 to 2003-04. We have focused on states‟ own revenue as 
expenditure side variable, since that would give us some idea regarding 
their  own  effort  in  containing  the  budget  deficit..  We  have  used  the 
standard econometric techniques  of  cointegration, error correction and 
Granger  causality.  Results  are  somewhat  mixed.  For  Andhra  Pradesh, 
total  revenue  and  total  expenditure  seems  synchronized,  while  for 
expenditure  without  interest  payments,  spend-to-tax  hypothesis  is 
supported. For Karnataka, we obtain presence of unidirectional causality 
running from total own revenue to total revenue expenditure. For Kerala, 
we  found  the  evidence  for  fiscal  synchronization.  For  Tamil  Nadu,  we 
failed  to  detect  any  indication  of  either  cointegration  or  causality.  It 
seems  that  the  decisions  are  institutionally  uncoupled.  It  seems  that, 
within the states, we find a lot of variations á la Payne (1998).  
 
The  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  The  first  section  discusses 
about the data and its brief description; the next section presents the 
methodology as well as the results, followed by the conclusion section. 
                                                 
1 For 14 major Indian states.  
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DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Our data source is the Reserve Bank of India and annual in nature.
1  We 
use  the  state‟s  total  own  revenue  receipts  and  state‟s  total  own  tax 
revenue. We do not include variables like states‟ share on central taxes or 
the  grants  that  the  states  get  from  the  central  government.  On  the 
expenditure side we use states‟ revenue expenditure with and without 
interest  payments.    We  work  with  real  per  capita  data  (base  year  is 
1993/94) and the net state domestic product price deflator is being used 
for converting the nominal variables in real terms.  All the variables are 
expressed  in  natural  logarithms.  We  focus  mainly  on  four  southern 
states, namely, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Our 
sample is period is from 1980/81 to 2004/05, thus giving us twenty five 
observations per state.  
   
Table 12.1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables that we 
use in our analysis. We present three alternative revenue deficit variables 
(all expressed as a proportion of state domestic product). Revenue deficit 
1  is  defined  as  the  difference  between  total  own  tax  revenue  and 
revenue  expenditure.    Revenue  deficit  2  is  defined  as  the  difference 
between  total  own  tax  revenue  and  revenue  expenditure  without  the 
interest  payments.    Revenue  deficit  3  is  defined  as  the  difference 
between total own revenue and revenue expenditure. 
 
  Several observations can be made from Table 12.1.  The average 
total own revenue and the average total own tax revenue is highest for 
the state of Tamil Nadu and lowest in case of Andhra Pradesh. The same 
is  true  with  the  expenditure  variables.  Second,  the  variability  of  the 
revenue  variable  is  lowest  for  Andhra  Pradesh.  Third,  the  state  of 
                                                 
1  Data  on  tax  and  expenditure  variables  are  from  Handbook  of  Statistics  on  State 
Government Finances and the data on per capita net state domestic product from the 
Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy.  
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Karnataka and Tamil Nadu shows greater dispersion with the expenditure 
variables.   Fourth the average revenue deficit except for revenue deficit 
2, is highest in case of Andhra Pradesh. Last, the standard deviation of 
the  revenue  deficit  is  largest  in  Tamil  Nadu.  To  get  a  better 
understanding of the movements in all these variables, we carry out a 




We divide this section in three sub-sections: sub-section 1 deals with the 
univariate unit root test; the results from the cointegration is reported in 
sub-section  2,  whereas  in  sub-section  3,  given  the  results  of 
cointegration test, we present the error-correction models. 
 
Univariate Unit Root Tests  
We begin with an analysis of univariate unit root results. The univariate 
unit  root  tests  provide  time  series  information  about  the  stationarity 
properties of the individual series. We have performed the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  unit  root  tests  to  serve  as  a  benchmark  for  the 
subsequent analysis. We estimate the following equation: 
         t
k
1 j
j t j 1 t t ε ΔP γ δt βP ʱ ΔP      

                      …(1) 
where Pt is the series in question. To select the lag length k, we follow 
the  modified  Akaike  information  criteria  suggested  by  Ng  and  Perron 
(2001). Since we only have 25 observations through time, we start with  
k = kmax = 3. We include a trend term in (1).  The null hypothesis of a 
unit  root  is  rejected  in  favour  of  the  alternative  if     is  significantly 









Andhra Pradesh  Karnataka  Kerala  Tami Nadu 
MMean  SS.D.  MMean  SS.D.  MMean  SS.D.  MMean  SS.D. 
Total Own Revenue
a  6.65  0.28  6.85  0.34  6.70  0.31  6.88  0.34 
Total Own Tax 
Revenue
a  6.38  0.31  6.62  0.39  6.54  0.37  6.73  0.37 
Total Revenue 
Expenditure




a  6.99  0.26  7.08  0.33  7.04  0.32  7.18  0.33 
Revenue Deficit 1   -0.082  0.012  -0.074  0.012  -0.070  0.020  -0.065  0.015 
Revenue Deficit  2  -0.093  0.011  -0.079  0.011  -0.094  0.014  -0.078  0.021 
Revenue Deficit  3  -0.057  0.009  -0.047  0.005  -0.053  0.013  -0.048  0.011 
Per Capita Real SDP  8.86  0.324  8.92  0.360  8.84  0.388  9.01  0.376 
Note: All the variables are in per capita real terms (1993/94 as the base) and in natural 
logarithm.  
 
Total  own  Revenue  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  total  own  tax 
revenue and total own non-tax revenue. Revenue deficit 1 is defined as 
the difference between total own tax revenue and revenue expenditure 
expressed as a proportion of State Domestic Product.  Revenue deficit 2 
is defined as the difference between total own tax revenue and revenue 
expenditure without the interest payments expressed as a proportion of 
State Domestic Product.  Revenue deficit 3 is defined as the difference 
between  total  own  revenue  and  revenue  expenditure  expressed  as  a 
proportion of State Domestic Product.   
 
  The results of the ADF „studentized-t‟ tests are reported in Table 
12.2. Of the 32 cases considered, we reject the null hypothesis in only 5 
cases at the 10% marginal significance level, and just 2 at the 5% level.   
  
10 






Karnataka  Kerala  Tamil 
Nadu 
Total Own Revenue
a  -1.348  -0.343  -3.149  -3.117 
Total Own Tax 
Revenue
a 











-2.171  -1.568  -4.301
**  -2.464 
Revenue Deficit 1   -3.088  -1.225  -2.211  -2.589 
Revenue Deficit  2  -3.544
*  -2.490  -2.673  -2.356 
Revenue Deficit  3  -3.503
*  -1.971  -2.048  -1.732 
Per Capita SDP  -2.601  -2.417  -2.634  -1.943 
Note: All the variables are in per capita real terms (1993/94 as the base) 
and in natural logarithm.  
 
Total  own  Revenue  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  total  own  tax 
revenue and total own non-tax revenue. Revenue deficit 1 is defined as 
the difference between total own tax revenue and revenue expenditure 
expressed as a proportion of State Domestic Product.  Revenue deficit 2 
is defined as the difference between total own tax revenue and revenue 
expenditure without the interest payments expressed as a proportion of 
State Domestic Product.  Revenue deficit 3 is defined as the difference 
between  total  own  revenue  and  revenue  expenditure  expressed  as  a 
proportion of State Domestic Product.  We include a constant and a trend 
term while testing for the presence of unit root in the variables.  We use 
Modified  Akaike  Information  Criteria  for  selecting  the  lag-length  while 
testing for the unit root starting with a maximum lag-length of four.  The 
critical values are -4.394 (at 1%), -3.612(at 5%) and -3.243 (at 10%) 
respectively. *
 (**) denotes significance at 10% (5%) level. 
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  We obtain the revenue deficit variable is non-stationary in most 
cases  except  for  Andhra  Pradesh,  where  it  is  stationary  in  case  of 
revenue deficit 2 and revenue deficit 3. This in turn can be considered as 
support for the “strong form” of the revenue deficit sustainability. Non-
stationary  behavior  in  other  cases  implies  an  unsustainable  budgetary 
process.  Our  result  is  consistent  with  Hamilton  and  Flavin  (1986)  for 
Andhra Pradesh but in all other cases corroborates the findings of Wilcox 
(1989), Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991), and Kremers (1989).  
 
Cointegration Tests  
Methodology 
The Engle-Granger (1987) test is the most commonly employed (single 
equation) approach to the analysis of cointegration. Given two variables 
of interest {yt, xt}, the first stage of this two-step procedure involves the 
estimation of the following static cointegrating regression: 
t t t t u βx ʱ y                            …(2) 
where ʱt denotes a deterministic term which may be either an intercept 
or  an  intercept  and  linear  trend.  In  the  second  step,  potential 
cointegration  between  {yt,  xt}  is  examined  by  analysing  the  order  of 
integration  of  the  estimated  residuals  { t u ˆ }  from  equation  (2)  using 
Dickey-Fuller  as  outlined  in  equation  (1).  If  the  estimated  residuals  is 
stationary, then we claim that {yt, xt} are cointegrated. 
 
  However,  note  that  the  Engle-Granger  (1987)  test  is  a  single-
equation procedure and thus ignores the potential endogeneity.  We also 
cannot conduct any statistical tests on cointegration vector coefficients as 
the standard errors are unreliable.  Given these problems, we apply the 
cointegration methodology of Johansen (1988, 1991) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990). These methods have been shown to have sound large 
and finite-sample properties. Let Xt denote a px1 vector of I(1) variables. 
To  implement  an  amalgam  of  these  procedures,  the  least  squares 
residuals  are  estimated,  assuming  that  a  k-dimensional  vector  
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autoregressive process can describe the data. Consequently, the data can 
be represented as: 
t k t k 2 t 2 1 t 1 t t ε X ... X X φ X                     …(3) 
where εt is an independent and identically distributed Gaussian process, 
φt is the unrestricted constant and  Πi are p x p matrices. In order to 
distinguish  between  stationarity  by  linear  combinations  (cointegration) 
and  by  differencing,  one  subtracts  Xt-1  from  both  sides  of  the  above 
equation and obtains: 
t 1 k t 1 k 2 t 2 1 t 1 k t t ε X Γ ... X Γ X Γ φ X ΔX                …(4) 
where   
 





j j i I   I; Γ and I is the identity matrix. There 
are three possible cases to consider: (1) Rank (Π) = p (Xt is stationary); 
(2) Rank (Π) = 0 (absence of any stationary long-run relationship among 
the variables in Xt) and (3) Rank (Π) = r < p where r determines the 
number of cointegrating relationship. When r < p, the equation has an 
error correction representation (Engle and Granger (1987)). Johansen‟s 
multivariate cointegration is equivalent to the estimation of the rank of Π. 
Johansen derives two tests of the hypothesis that there are at most  r 
cointegrating  relationships,  namely  the  maximum  eigenvalue  statistics 
and the trace statistics. In case of trace statistics, the null hypothesis that 
there is at most r cointegrating relationship is tested against a general 
alternative that it is greater, whereas in the maximum eigenvalue test the 
alternative  is  defined  explicitly  (at  most  r  cointegrating  relationship  is 




We report the results from Johansen‟s procedure in Tables 12.3a – 12.3d.  
We  start  with  a  maximum  lag-length  of  two  in  vector-autoregressive 
model and use the Akaike information  criteria (AIC) to select  the lag-
length.  Our model includes a constant and a trend in the cointegrating 
relationship.  We  consider  four  pairs:  a)  Total  Own  Revenue-Total 
Revenue  Expenditure;  b)  Total  Own  Tax  Revenue-Total  Revenue 
Expenditure;  c)  Total  Own  Revenue  -  Total  Revenue  Expenditure  with 
Interest  Payments  and  d)  Total  Own  Tax  Revenue  -  Total  Revenue 
Expenditure  without  Interest  Payments.    In  case  of  Andhra  Pradesh 
(Table 12.3a), we obtain the presence of one cointegrating relationship in 
all the four cases by the maximum eigenvalue test and in two cases by 
the trace test.  Our result for Karnataka (Table 12.3b) is mixed in nature.  
 
Table 12.3a: Cointegration Test Results 
 
Variables  Andhra Pradesh 
Maximum Eigen Value  Trace 
None  At Most 
One 
None  At Most 
One 










Total Own Tax Revenue-









Total Own Revenue - Total 
Revenue Expenditure 









Total Own Tax Revenue - 
Total Revenue Expenditure 









Note:   For the definition of all the variables, please see notes to Table 12.1 and 
Table  12.2.  The  numbers  in  parenthesis  are  the  p-values  based  on 
MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999). We use a lag-length of two based 
on  Akaike  Information  Criteria.  Our  model  includes  a  constant  and  a 
trend in the cointegrating relationship.  
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Table 12.3b: Cointegration Test Results 
Variables  Karnataka 
Maximum Eigen Value  Trace 
None  At Most 
One 
None  At Most 
One 










Total Own Tax Revenue-









Total Own Revenue - Total 
Revenue Expenditure 









Total Own Tax Revenue - 
Total Revenue Expenditure 









Note: For the definition of all the variables, please see notes to Table 12.1 and 
Table  12.2.  The  numbers  in  parenthesis  are  the  p-values  based  on 
MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999). We use a lag-length of one based 
on Akaike Information Criteria. Our model includes a constant and a trend 
in the cointegrating relationship.   
 
We  provide  the  evidence  in  favour  of  cointegration  when  we 
consider the relationship between use of total own tax revenue and total 
revenue expenditure (with or without interest payments).  However, if we 
use total own revenue and total revenue expenditure ((with or without 
interest payments), we find that there exists no cointegration between 
the  variables.  In  Table  12.3c,  we  report  the  results  for  the  state  of 
Kerala.  We could not perform the analysis for total own tax revenue-
total  revenue  expenditure  without  interest  payments  as  both  the 
variables  are  stationary  at  5%  level  of  significance.    Although  the 
maximum  eigenvalue  test  statistic  fails  to  detect  the  presence  of 
cointegrating  relationship  between  total  own  revenue-total  revenue 
expenditure, the trace statistics indicate the presence of cointegration at 
10% level of significance.   
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Table 12.3c: Cointegration Test Results 
Variables 
Kerala 
Maximum Eigen Value  Trace 
None  At Most 
One 
None  At Most 
One 










Total Own Tax Revenue-









Total Own Revenue - Total 
Revenue Expenditure 









Note:  For the definition of all the variables, please see notes to Table 12.1 and Table 
12.2. The numbers in parenthesis are the p-values based on MacKinnon, Haug 
and Michelis (1999). We use a lag-length of one based on Akaike Information 
Criteria  except  for  the  Total  Own  Revenue-Total  Revenue  Expenditure 
relationship,  where the  lag-length  was  set  to  be  equal  to  two.    Our model 
includes a constant and a trend in the cointegrating relationship. We could not 
perform  the  analysis  for  total  own  tax  revenue-total  revenue  expenditure 
without interest payments as both the variables are stationary at 5% level of 
significance  (see  Table  12.2). However the  Granger Causality  Test  suggests 
that there exists unidirectional causality from own tax revenue to total revenue 
expenditure without interest payments. 
 
In case of total own tax revenue-total revenue expenditure (with 
or without interest payments), we get the presence of cointegration by 
both the statistics.  The results for the state of Tamil Nadu are presented 
in Table 12.3d.  Note, in all the four cases that we have considered, we 
find no evidence in favour of cointegration. 
 
  In sum, we infer that in three out of the four states that we have 
considered,  the  presence  of  cointegration  between  the  state‟s  own 
revenue  and  revenue  expenditure  is  present.  The  existence  of 
cointegration between revenues and expenditures can be considered as 
evidence  consistent  with  the  intertemporal  budget  constraint  and  the 
„weak form‟ of the sustainability of budget deficits.  Our results in case of 
Andhra  Pradesh,  Karnataka  and  Kerala  confirm  the  findings  of  Haug  
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(1991),  Tanner  and  Liu  (1994),  Quintos  (1995),  Payne  (1997),  Martin 
(2001) and Cunado et al. (2004). 
 





Maximum Eigen Value  Trace 
None  At Most 
One 
None  At Most 
One 




















Total Own Revenue - Total 










Total Own Tax Revenue - 
Total Revenue Expenditure 









Note: For the definition of all the variables, please see notes to Table 12.1 and Table 12.2. 
The  numbers  in  parenthesis  are  the  p-values  based  on  MacKinnon,  Haug  and 
Michelis (1999). We use a lag-length of two based on Akaike Information Criteria. 
Our model includes a constant and a trend in the cointegrating relationship. 
 
Error-correction Models 
In  order  to  focus  on  the  short-run  dynamics,  we  build  up  the  error-
correction mechanism for those cases where we have obtained evidence 
in favour of cointegration. We can also use the error-correction model to 
test  for  the  direction  of  causality.    The  error-correction  model  for  the 
two-variable {yt, xt} system can be specified as:  














ect δ x Δ ʱ y Δ ʱ λ Δx














   
   
 
 
       …(5) 
where k denotes the lag-length in the original VAR model, λ1 (λ2) are 
constants,  ect  denotes  the  estimated  error-correction  term.  Johansen  
17 
(1992) shows that if a variable is weakly exogenous for the purpose of 
estimating  the  elements  of  the  cointegrating  vector,  then  the 
corresponding elements of δ should be zero. Therefore, weak exogeneity 
of the variable yt (xt) can be tested by testing the null that δ1 = 0 (δ2 = 
0).  
 
Table 12.4a: Error-Correction Model (Andhra Pradesh) 
Variables  Total Own Revenue – 
Total Revenue Expenditure 
Total Own Tax Revenue- 
Total Revenue Expenditure 















Total Own Revenuet-1  0.160 
(0.815) 
0.002 
(0.011)  --  -- 
Total Own Tax 


























Total Own Revenue – 
Total Revenue Expenditure 
without Interest Payments 
Total Own Tax Revenue- 
Total Revenue Expenditure 

















   
Total Own Tax 
Revenuet-1 

























Note: We work with the first-differenced series for all the variables. For the definition of all 
the  variables,  please  see  notes  to  Table  12.1  and  Table  12.2.  The  numbers  in 
parenthesis are the t-statistics. *, **, and *
 ** denotes significant at 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively.  (1) uses Total Own Revenue as the dependent variable and in 
(2) Total Revenue Expenditure is being used as the dependent variable. Similarly in 
(3) Total Own Tax Revenue is the dependent variable and in (4) Total Revenue 
Expenditure without interest payments is being used as the dependent variable. 
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  The  coefficient  has  a  standard  t-distribution  since  all  the 
variables  in  the  regression  are  stationary.  We  report  the  results  for 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala in Tables 12.4a, 12.4b and 12.4c 
respectively.  The results  are reported only  for those cases where we 
have obtained the evidence in favour of cointegration. 
 
The result for Andhra Pradesh is mixed in nature (Table 12.4a).  
When we analyze the relationship using total revenue expenditure, we 
find  that  the  error  correction  term  is  significant  in  both  equations 
(Column (1) & Columns (2), Column (3) & Column (4)). This implies that 
errors from cointegrating vector affect both the changes in total own per 
capita  real  revenue  (own  per  capita  tax  revenue)  and  changes  in  per 
capita revenue expenditure. This in turn provides support for the fiscal 
synchronization (revenue and spending decisions are taken and executed 
at the same time).  However, when we use revenue expenditure without 
interest payments, our results change.  
 
  In  case  of  Total  Own  Revenue  –  Total  Revenue  Expenditure 
without Interest Payments relationship, errors from cointegrating vector 
influences the changes in revenue expenditure but not that in own total 
revenue  providing  us  support  that  own  revenue  acts  as  the  weakly 
exogenous variable and therefore an evidence in favour of the revenue-
to-spend hypothesis.  In case of Total Own Tax Revenue – Total Revenue 
Expenditure  without  Interest  Payments  relationship,  errors  from 
cointegrating vector influences the changes in own tax revenue but not 








Table 12.4b: Error-Correction Model (Karnataka) 
Variables 
Total Own Tax Revenue-
Revenue Expenditure 
Total Own Tax Revenue 
– Revenue Expenditure 
without Interest 
Payments 

























Note: We work with the first-differenced series for all the variables. For the definition of all 
the  variables,  please  see  notes  to  Table  12.1  and  Table  12.2.  The  numbers  in 
parenthesis are the t-statistics. *, **, and *
 ** denotes significant at 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively.  (1) uses Total Own Tax Revenue as the dependent variable 
and in (2) Total Revenue Expenditure is being used as the dependent variable. 
Similarly in (3) Total Own Tax Revenue is the dependent variable and in (4) Total 
Revenue  Expenditure  without  interest  payments  is  being  used  as  the  dependent 
variable.  Given the absence of any cointegrating relationship in case of Total Own 
Revenue  and  Total  Revenue  Expenditure  with  or  without  interest  payments,  we 
have  conducted  the  Granger  Causality  test  using  the  first-differenced  series  for 
these variables.  In both cases, we have obtained the presence of unidirectional 
causality from total own revenue to total revenue expenditure.  
 
In Table 12.4b, we report the results for Karnataka. Given the 
absence of any cointegrating relationship in case of Total Own Revenue 
and Total Revenue Expenditure with or without interest payments, we 
have  conducted  the  Granger  Causality  test  using  the  first-differenced 
series for these variables.  In both cases, we have obtained the presence 
of  unidirectional  causality  running  from  total  own  revenue  to  total 
revenue expenditure. When we examine the Total Own Tax Revenue and 
Total  Revenue  Expenditure  with  or  without  interest  payments 
relationship,  we  found  that  tax  revenues  are  weakly  exogenous  since 
they do not respond to the errors in the cointegrating vector.  Only the 
revenue  expenditure  adjusts  to  eliminate  errors  in  the  cointegrating  
20 
vector.    Therefore,  our  results  in  case  of  Karnataka  can  be  used  as 
evidence favouring the tax-to-spend hypothesis.   
 
Table 12.4c: Error-Correction Model (Kerala) 














































(-0.198)  --  --  --  -- 


















Note: We work with the first-differenced series for all the variables. For the definition of all 
the  variables,  please  see  notes  to  Table  12.1  and  Table  12.2.  The  numbers  in 
parenthesis are the t-statistics. *, **, and *
 ** denotes significant at 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively.  (1) uses Total Own Revenue as the dependent variable and in 
(2) Total Revenue Expenditure is being used as the dependent variable. Similarly in 
(3) Total Own Tax Revenue is the dependent variable and in (4) Total Revenue 
Expenditure  is  being  used  as  the  dependent  variable.  In  (5)  we  use  Total  Own 
Revenue as the dependent variable and in (6)  Total Revenue Expenditure without 
interest payments is being used as the dependent variable. 
 
  In case of Kerala, we could not perform the analysis for total own 
tax revenue-total revenue expenditure without interest payments as both 
the variables are stationary at 5% level of significance (see Table 12.2). 
The  Granger  Causality  Test  suggests  that  there  exists  unidirectional 
causality  from  own  tax  revenue  to  total  revenue  expenditure  without  
21 
interest payments. In all the other three cases (Table 12.4c) the errors 
from cointegrating vector affect both the changes in total own per capita 
real  revenue  (own  per  capita  tax  revenue)  and  changes  in  per  capita 
revenue  expenditure.  This  in  turn  provides  support  for  the  fiscal 
synchronization (revenue and spending decisions are taken and executed 
at the same time). 
 
Table 12.4d: Granger Causality Test Results (Tamil Nadu) 
Relationship  Test-Statistic 
and Inference 
Total Own Revenue causes Total Revenue 
Expenditure 
0.03 (0.97), NO 
Total Revenue Expenditure causes Total Own 
Revenue 
0.47 (0.63), NO 
Total Own Tax Revenue causes Total Revenue 
Expenditure 
0.31 (0.74), NO 
Total Revenue Expenditure causes Total Own 
Tax Revenue 
0.12 (0.89), NO 
Total Own Revenue causes Total Revenue 
Expenditure without Interest Payments 
0.09 (0.91), NO 
Total Revenue Expenditure without Interest 
Payments causes Total Own Revenue 
0.51 (0.61), NO 
Total Own Tax Revenue causes Total Revenue 
Expenditure without Interest Payments 
0.38 (0.69), NO 
Total Revenue Expenditure without Interest 
Payments causes Total Own Tax Revenue 
0.18 (0.83), NO 
Note:  We  work  with  the  first-differenced  series  for  all  the  variables.  For  the 
definition of all the variables, please see notes to Table 12.1 and Table 
12.2. The numbers in parenthesis are the p-values based on F-Statistic. 
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  We do not obtain any evidence in favour of cointegration using 
data from Tamil Nadu.  Therefore, we conduct the Granger causality test 
after taking the first-differenced of the data.  The result is reported in 
Table 12.4d.  We do not find any evidence for the Granger causality and 





This paper, we believe, is the first attempt to investigate the revenue-
expenditure  hypothesis  for  the  Southern  states  taken  separately  such 
that  we  can  avoid  any  aggregation  problem.  To  this  end,  we  used 
cointegration tests to see if the series move together in time, and, if they 
do, the direction of causality. As in other studies in context of US states, 
we did not find any monotonic result. For Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, 
fiscal  synchronization  seems  to  be  the  mode;  for  Karnataka  revenues 
lead  to  expenditure.  For  Tamil  Nadu,  the  data  failed  to  show  any 
evidence of causality.  
 
  Given these mixed nature of the conclusion, the next question is 
why  such  inconclusive  results  emerge?  We  believe  that  a  full  scale 
analysis must include the role of (discretionary) central grants as well as 
some political factors. Moreover, increasing the database to include all (at 
least 14 major) Indian states is another extension that we are looking 
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